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Abstract 
With the evolution of new technologies, the growing reliance on networks has increased immensely. Such an advancement 
induces malicious attacks and software errors to occur frequently. Building robust network services that can tolerate a wide 
range of failure types is a fundamental problem in distributed systems. The most fundamental approach, called Byzantine fault 
tolerance, helps mask arbitrary failures exhibited by failing nodes. Here, the problem of reliably broadcasting messages in a 
mutli hop network is dealt, where some nodes are likely to fail. Most of the existing solutions require high network connectivity 
and these requirements become difficult to satisfy when the network grows large. In this paper, a study on various Byzantine 
fault tolerant methods has been carried out which has been developed and implemented by research experts in this field. These 
solutions are particularly customized to adapt to sparsely connected networks. 
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1. Introduction 
In this modern era, the World Wide Web is being used by millions of people on a day-to-day basis for various 
purposes. Through the use of a standard web browser, the user can acquire information stored on Web servers 
situated anywhere on the globe. This results in an illusion that all this information is situated locally on the user’s 
computer. But in reality, the Web depicts a huge distributed system that occur as a single resource to the user. 
There are several definitions and outlooks on what distributed systems are. According to Tanenbaum, a 
distributed system is interpreted as “A group of independent computers that portrays as a single computer to the 
users of the system” [2]. Leslie Lamport’s interpretation of distributed system is postulated as “A distributed system 
is one in which the failure of a computer you didn't even know existed can convert your own computer unusable”. 
A common misapprehension that surrounds the concept of distributed systems is that it is just another label for a 
network of computers. However, this neglects an important distinction. A distributed system is one that is built on 
top of a network and it tries to hide the existence of multiple autonomous computers. A distributed system appears 
as a single entity providing the user with the services required.  
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One of the compelling characteristic of distributed systems that sets them apart from single machine systems is 
the notion of partial failure. The terminology partial failure is used when a part of the system is failing while the 
remaining part continues to operate, and seemingly correctly. Hence, an important objective in distributed systems 
design is to construct system in such a way that it can automatically recover from partial failures without sorely 
affecting the overall performance. In other words, a distributed system is expected to be fault tolerant. While 
designing any system to be fault tolerant, it first requires the selection of a fault model, a set of probable failure 
scenarios along with an intellect of the frequency, duration, and impact of each scenario.  
A wide range of communication applications assume the availability of a reliable network. At this stage, data are 
expected to traverse the network and to arrive intact at their destination. Therefore, achieving fault tolerance and 
reliable communication are strongly related. 
 
2. Fault Tolerance- An Overview 
Fault tolerance is one which is strongly related to dependable systems. Dependability covers a number of 
favorable requirements for distributed systems including the following: availability, maintainability reliability, and 
safety. 
 Availability refers to the property in which a system is ready to be used immediately. In particular, it is defined 
as the probability the system is operating correctly at any given moment and is able to perform functions on behalf 
of its users. Reliability is defined as the property that a system can run continuously without failure. Safety is 
defined as the situation that when a system temporarily fails to operate correctly, nothing catastrophic happens. 
Finally, maintainability pertains to how easily a failed system can be restored. However, automatic recovering from 
failures is much harder in practice than in theory. A system is said to have failed when it is unable to meet its 
promises. Particularly, if a distributed system is designed to provide its users with a certain number of services, the 
system is said to have failed when some of those services cannot be provided. An error is described as a part of the 
system’s state that may lead to a failure.  
Faults are classified as transient, intermittent or permanent. Transient faults occur only once and then tends to 
disappear. If the operation is repeated, the fault tends to disappear. An intermittent fault occurs, then vanishes, then 
recur and so on. Intermittent faults are caused by loose wires. Finally, a permanent fault is one that persists until the 
faulty component is replaced. Dependable systems are required to control faults. It is important to comprehend how 
to handle failure when one has occurred. Table I helps understand the various types of failure schemes which are 
described by Cristian [3] and Hadzilacos and Toueg [4].  
 
 
Table I. Different types of failure 
 
Type of failure Description 
Crash Failure A server is working correctly until it halted. 
Omission Failure 
x Receive Omission 
x Send Omission 
A server fails to respond to incoming requests. 
A server fails to receive incoming messages. 
A server fails to send messages. 
Timing Failure A server’s response lies outside the time interval. 
Response Failure 
x Value Failure 
x State Transition Failure 
A server’s response is incorrect. 
The value of the response is wrong. 
The server deviates from correct flow of control. 
Arbitrary Failure A server produce arbitrary response at any given time. 
 
 
A crash failure is said to have occurred when a server prematurely halts, but was working correctly until it 
stopped. An omission failure occurs when a server fails to respond to a request. In the case of a receive omission 
failure, there is a possibility that the server by no means got the request in the first place. Generally, a receive 
omission failure will not influence the current state of the server, as the server is oblivious of any message sent to it. 
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Similarly, a send omission failure occurs when the server has completed its work, but somehow fails to send a 
response. Timing failures occur when the response lies outside a particular real-time interval. An important class of 
failure is a response failure, by which the server’s response is simply incorrect. A server is subject to two kinds of 
response failures. In the case of a value failure, a server simply provides the wrong reply to a request. The second 
class of response failure is known as a state transition failure. This kind of failure happens when the server responds 
unexpectedly to an incoming request. Among the variety of failures that a server can exhibit, the most serious are 
arbitrary failures, also known as Byzantine failure.  
A Byzantine fault is defined as an arbitrary fault that occurs during the execution of an algorithm by a distributed 
system. When a Byzantine failure occurs, the system may respond in any arbitrary way unless it is designed to have 
Byzantine fault tolerance. Byzantine fault tolerance is very critical because small arbitrary failures in one node can 
bring down the whole system.  When discussing fault tolerance, the familiar terms synchronous and asynchronous 
has the following significance. A synchronous system is one that responds within a known, finite amount of time, 
but an asynchronous system does not. 
A majority of the existing solutions require high network connectivity, and are not customized to sparsely 
connected networks. The general idea of [1], [5] and [6] is to trade perfectly reliable communication between correct 
nodes in exchange to support low-connectivity communication with many Byzantine nodes. Informally, a small 
minority of correct nodes are declined reliable communication, provided that a large majority of correct nodes can 
reliably communicate. Such a loss in safety guarantees looks acceptable since, by hypothesis, many Byzantine nodes 
(with arbitrary behavior) are already present in the system. As a result, this tradeoff permits tolerating a high number 
of Byzantine nodes, even in low degree networks such as grids. 
 
3. Related Works 
Miguel Castro et al [7] proposed a Byzantine Fault Tolerant protocol that is based on concept of cryptography. 
According to Castro, the nodes use digital signatures to authenticate the user across multiple hops. But the most 
salient feature is that cryptography needs a trusted infrastructure to initially distribute their public and private keys: 
hence, if this infrastructure fails, the whole network fails. For these reasons, non- cryptographic solutions were 
proposed.  
Cryptography-free solutions were first studied in completely connected networks [8], [9] and [10]. The notion of 
completely connected networks is: a node can directly communicate with any other node, which implies the 
presence of a channel between each pair of nodes. However, these approaches are hardly scalable, as the number of 
channels per node can be physically limited. Therefore, solutions in multi hop networks were introduced, where a 
node must rely on other nodes to broadcast a message.  
A significant class of algorithms tolerates Byzantine failures with either space [20], [21] or time [16], [17], [18], 
[19] locality. Space local algorithms try to suppress the fault as close to the source as possible. This is only relevant 
to those problems where the information from distant nodes is unimportant. Also, time local algorithms presented so 
far can tolerate up to one Byzantine node, and are unable to mask the effect of Byzantine actions. Consequently, this 
approach is not applicable to reliable broadcast.  
To limit the action of Byzantine nodes, Alexandre Maurer et al [11] proposed control zones. A control zone is 
defined by its core, an arbitrary set of nodes, and its border, a node-cut isolating the core from the rest of the 
network. The significance of this protocol is that messages must pass through the border in order to gain access to 
the core. The underlying idea is to define a lot of control zones on the network, converging with each other, in order 
to minimize the broadcasting of Byzantine messages.  
The protocol was tested out on grid-shaped networks, although this principle can be applied to any network 
topology. The only existing solution working on a grid or a torus is Explorer [12]. However, it requires defining a 
proper set of control zones to limit the byzantine influence. Defining optimal sets of control zones for a 
communication graph and Byzantine node distribution is a challenge.  
Alexandre Maurer et al [13], [14] introduced the Trigger method to overcome the difficulty faced when the nodes 
do not know the global topology. Here, to limit the diffusion of false information, a node must obtain it through 
several node-disjoint paths, where each path has a maximal length. The underlying idea is as follows: if the 
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Byzantine nodes are adequately spaced, they will never manage to broadcast false information. However, by 
assuming that the global topology knowledge is not known has a toll on cost in terms of performance.  
Alexandre Maurer et al [15] presented the Fractal method, which enables to preserve performances as the size of 
the network increases. All aforementioned solutions share a common weakness: when the grid size increases, the 
communication probability eventually falls to zero. There exists at least one critical configuration of Byzantine 
failures, which allows the Byzantine nodes to broadcast as many false messages as they want. As a result, the 
probability of reliable communication falls to zero. Therefore, a constant Byzantine rate of λ is assumed. Therefore, 
when the size of the grid increases, the probability to have a critical configuration somewhere in the grid approaches 
to 1, and the communication probability approaches 0. In other words, the number of Byzantine failures that can be 
tolerated increases with the number of nodes. 
 
Table II. Comparison of Existing Solutions 
 
Method Criteria Advantages Drawbacks 
Local Broadcast Proportion of Byzantine nodes in 
each neighborhood 
Simple and efficient 
algorithm 
Does not work on grid 
Explorer Connectivity of 2k+1 for k Byzantine 
nodes 
Criteria on the topology of 
the network 
Tolerates at most 1 
Byzantine failure on grid 
Control Zones Byzantine node surrounded by a 
control zone 
Tolerates many Byzantine 
failures with high 
probability 
Requires global 
knowledge 
Trigger Distance between Byzantine nodes Tolerates many Byzantine 
failures without topology 
knowledge 
Weaker performances than 
control zone 
Fractal Byzantine rate λ Communication 
probability preserved as 
the diameter increases 
Only works for λ< 10-5 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
With the advent of new technologies, communication through networks has increased tremendously. Due to this, 
reliable communication of information over networks has become ever so important. In this paper, various fault 
tolerance mechanism was studied, among which tolerating Byzantine faults seemed the most challenging because of 
their arbitrary behavior. A brief description on the existing solutions for Byzantine broadcast was stated to ensure 
reliable communication even in the presence Byzantine faults. The solutions studied are customized to adapt to 
sparsely connected networks. 
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